This blog was created some time ago with the intention of following through the Brexit experience in Britain after leaving the EU. I can only apologise that I had not been able to post regularly and I am partially blaming the normalisation and tiredness about this topic that happened in the society. However the topic has been always relevant to me and I have continued to follow, repost and comment more structured initiatives in this area beginning with Best for Britain and the European Movement.

However we are approaching a birthday. Yes that birthday. 23rd of June 2016. Ten years.

My last post was from July 2023 and plenty of things changes since then. I wanted to find a way of summarising the public discourse in this matter happened in the last three years. And I asked for help from another newcomer in the public domain: AI. So I quickly asked ChatGPT to “summarise what happened between July 2023 and today in the public discourse related to Brexit in the UK and abroad”.

Brexit disappeared from front-line electoral politics. One of the most striking developments was that Brexit largely vanished as a major campaign issue during the 2024 UK General Election. Both Labour and the Conservatives avoided reopening the Leave/Remain divide, focusing instead on the NHS, cost of living, immigration and economic growth. Commentators noted that Brexit had become politically toxic and offered little electoral advantage to either major party.

Economic impacts became the dominant Brexit narrative. From 2023 onwards, discussion increasingly centred on measurable economic outcomes rather than sovereignty or constitutional arguments. Numerous studies argued that Brexit had imposed significant costs on UK-EU trade and investment, particularly for smaller firms that struggled with new customs and regulatory requirements. The public discourse increasingly moved away from theoretical arguments and toward practical questions

Labour’s “reset” became the new centre ground. After Labour’s landslide victory in 2024, the government adopted a strategy described as a “reset” of relations with the EU. The phrase “make Brexit work” effectively replaced both “Get Brexit Done” and “Stop Brexit.”

Public opinion continued to move against Brexit. Perhaps the most important long-term trend was the continued shift in public opinion. By now there are majorities consistently said Brexit was a mistake with polling showing a majority support for closer EU relations and even some showing support for eventually re-joining the EU. However many voters who believed Brexit had failed were not necessarily demanding an immediate return to EU membership. This created a new political reality with public sentiment becoming more pro-European but political parties remained cautious about advocating re-joining.

Immigration became a paradox in the Brexit debate. Brexit had been heavily associated with promises of controlling immigration, yet post-Brexit Britain experienced historically high net migration from non-EU countries. Brexit had not been fully implemented or Brexit failed to achieve one of its central promises. The conversation increasingly became less about EU migration and more about broader migration policy. Academic analysis also found parliamentary discourse becoming more focused on border security and illegal immigration.

International perceptions shifted. Outside the UK, Brexit was increasingly viewed as a cautionary tale rather than a model. European commentators generally moved from anger or frustration toward pragmatism. Former European leaders and commentators increasingly discussed Swiss-style arrangements and incremental integration rather than full UK re-entry. The international conversation also became less ideological and more transactional focussing on defence cooperation, Ukraine, energy security, and trade efficiency

A generational divide became increasingly visible. Polling repeatedly showed overwhelming support among younger voters for closer ties with Europe and, in many cases, for re-joining the EU. Many younger adults were not old enough to vote in the 2016 referendum but would strongly favour a different outcome today. This created a growing narrative that Brexit may become less politically sustainable over the longer term as demographics change.

The debate moved from ideology to pragmatism. The defining characteristic of 2023–2026 was the decline of the original Brexit arguments. Brexit became less of a constitutional revolution and more of a policy management challenge. The public discourse evolved from a culture-war issue into a practical debate about trade, growth, immigration and Britain’s place in Europe. Opinion polls moved steadily toward closer EU ties, but mainstream politics remained cautious. The result was a new consensus: Brexit was no longer the central political battlefield, yet its consequences increasingly shaped discussions about almost every major challenge facing the UK.

United Kingdom was a relatively late joiner of EEC, it took decades to leave the EU. There is a growing regret of what happened in 2016 and it may take some time to reach a point where a more structured relationship will be accepted by the society at large opposite to the party in power of the moment only.

Time goes by so slowly said Madonna. We will not hung up 🙂